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Abstract 
Given the often crucial role of witness evidence in Occupational Health and Safety 
investigation, statements should be obtained as soon as possible after an incident using best 
practice methods. The present research systematically tested the efficacy of a novel Self-
Administered Witness Interview Tool (SAW-IT); an adapted version of the Self-
Administered Interview (SAI©) designed to elicit comprehensive information from witnesses 
to industrial events. The present study also examined whether completing the SAW-IT 
mitigated the effect of schematic processing on witness recall. Results indicate that the SAW-
IT elicited significantly more correct details, as well as more precise information than a 
traditional incident report form. Neither the traditional report from, nor the SAW-IT 
mitigated against biasing effects of contextual information about a worker’s safety history, 
confirming that witnesses should be shielded from extraneous post-event information prior to 
reporting. Importantly, these results demonstrate that the SAW-IT can enhance the quality of 
witness reports.   
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Introduction 
Investigating workplace-based accidents and incidents requires collecting accounts 
from the people involved in, and witness to, the incident as well as information about any 
equipment involved and the physical environment. This information is typically collected in 
order to (i) comprehensively understand how and why the incident occurred, (ii) prevent 
future similar adverse occurrences, and; (iii) pursue criminal investigations or inquiries if 
appropriate (Det Norske Veritas, 2003; Vincoli, 1994). Witness reports are often pivotal in 
such investigations; for instance, Canadian incident investigators (N = 186) estimated that 
testimony from workers comprises approximately 60% of the evidence they collect in an 
investigation. Significantly, 86% of the investigators rated this testimony evidence as either 
very important (61%) or important (25%) to their fact finding of event cause (MacLean, 
Brimacombe & Stinson, 2006).  
Challenges of investigating adverse industrial events 
The needs of Occupational Health and Safety (OHS) investigators are similar to that 
of police, i.e., the timely and unbiased questioning of witnesses. However, at present, in 
OHS investigation there is significant variability in how witnesses are managed after an 
event. Some investigators engage in brief interviews at the scene and follow-up with 
eliciting full statements at a later date, while others ask witnesses to write down their 
account of what happened using an incident report form (see Montgomery, 1996, for an 
example). Many organizations develop their own bespoke incident report forms, which 
typically lack any firm theoretical background or framework (Mearns, Whitaker, Flin, 
Gordon, & O’Connor, 2003). The rail industry provides an example of how the full range of 
these techniques are used to collect data from a witness: If a driver misses a sign or signal 
s/he may be notified of the incident initially in a telephone call and will be required to write a 
report about the missed signal at the end of his/her shift. Next, s/he will have an initial 
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interview within 24 hours, and then a full investigative interview within seven-days, possibly 
longer (Ryan, Hutchings & Lowe, 2010). This example reveals that investigators may rely on 
information obtained from witnesses using different information gathering approaches; in this 
case, incident report forms and different questioning formats. Given the importance of 
reliable witness evidence in investigations and the observation that OHS investigators may 
use incident report forms that vary in quality or only have the most basic of training in 
interview techniques, if any at all (Kelloway, Stinson & MacLean, 2004), the absence of a 
standardized best-practice method of collecting information from people involved with 
industrial events is a cause for concern.  
A further challenge for OHS investigators to workplace-based accidents and incidents 
is that eliciting thorough witness statements in a timely manner is often not practicable due to 
demands on resources. Investigators at the scene of an event may be faced with multiple 
responsibilities that take precedence over procuring thorough witness statements (e.g. 
preserving life and property, securing and preserving the scene, etc.). Furthermore, 
geographical remoteness of some locations (e.g. offshore oil and gas fields; remote mining) 
may delay the initial questioning of witnesses. Psychological research informs us that the 
quality of eyewitness accounts may be significantly compromised by a delay between 
witnessing an event and providing a report about it. Therefore, ideally, witnesses should be 
interviewed as soon as possible after an incident (see Brock, Fisher & Cutler, 1999; 
McCauley & Fisher, 1995). Any delay in reporting threatens the quality of information 
elicited because memory is prone to rapid decay (Ebbinghaus, 1885; Wixted & Carpenter, 
2007), but also because memory is fallible and vulnerable to the influence of misleading 
information from alternate sources. Information shared between witnesses may be related to 
the adverse event (e.g., a worker’s action during the incident), or contextual details not 
directly relevant to the incident (e.g., the injured worker’s safety history), yet both types of 
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information may shape a witness’s recollections (Davis & Loftus, 2007; Frenda, Nichols, & 
Loftus, 2011). Hence, any delay before reporting may compromise recall of detailed 
information and increase the opportunity and likelihood that erroneous post-event 
information will be encountered and incorporated into witness accounts.  
The role of contextual information 
Knowledge of contextual details (such as a worker’s safety history), can bias an 
investigation by influencing how people understand the cause of an incident/accident 
(MacLean, Brimacombe & Lindsay, 2013), and how an investigator questions witnesses 
about the incident (Hill, Memon, & McGeorge, 2008; Kelloway et al. 2004). For example, 
people’s expectations, knowledge and motivations enable them to rapidly select and 
incorporate information into their perception, encoding, and recollection of events (i.e., top 
down processing; Rumelhart & McClelland, 1986). MacLean and Dror (2016) outlined a 
five-level model of potential external sources of cognitive contamination that are separate 
from internal, self-generated, tendencies such as hindsight bias or the fundamental attribution 
error. The sources of bias in the model range from irrelevant information imbedded in the 
data itself (e.g., the vehicle looks like a liability but is, in fact, structurally sound); to the 
reference materials used (e.g., degraded tire tracks are compared and judged a match to the 
clear tracks from Truck A when in reality they belonged to another vehicle); to the 
surrounding context of the event (e.g., knowing that the employee was talking on his/her cell 
phone at the time of the incident); to one’s expectations based on experiences of what has 
occurred in the past (e.g., poor safety history of the worker); to broader organizational and 
motivational factors (e.g., an organizational culture that blames the worker).  
Dror’s (2012) “bias snowball effect” describes the magnitude to which the effect of 
context can distort investigative judgements. The snowball effect describes a process in 
which an opinion held by one information source (e.g., a witness) does not remain siloed but 
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is shared and acts as information that cognitively contaminates other, seemingly independent, 
sources of information (e.g., other witnesses, forensic experts). This spreading contamination 
amongst information sources can result in investigators rendering biased conclusions about 
event cause even though they have made rational decisions based on the evidence presented 
to them.  
In workplace environments employees are often knowledgeable about the safety 
history of the people, machinery, or other worksite factors and this information is a potential 
source of bias. This kind of contextual information about the safety of the worker shared just 
prior to an investigation of a workplace event has indeed been shown to bias both 
undergraduate-investigators’ and professional-investigators’ causal judgments of a workplace 
accident (MacLean et al. 2013). Witnesses naïve to a worker’s history prior to witnessing the 
event, but not prior to reporting, are similarly at risk of providing contaminated testimony as 
they may reconstruct the way in which the incident occurred to fit expectations once a co-
worker shares unsafe contextual information with them. Hence, using strategies that limit the 
effects of bias in witness testimony is foundational for good investigative decision-making.        
Potential solution to investigating adverse industrial events 
The current research addresses the challenges of (i) lack of standardized best-practice 
incident report form for the investigating of workplace incidents/accidents; (ii) frequent 
unavoidable delay in eliciting high quality witness accounts, and; (iii) potential for biased 
accounts resulting from irrelevant contextual knowledge, by investigating the efficacy of a 
Self-Administered Witness Interview Tool (SAW-ITTM1) as a method of enhancing the 
quality and quantity of information obtained from witnesses to an industrial event. In 
addition to tackling the challenges discussed above, this research also addresses appeals for 
                                                          
1 The Self-Administered Witness Interview Tool (SAW-IT) is a registered trademark (UK trademark 
number: UK00002545493) 
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professional organizations to become more scientifically oriented in their workplace inquiries 
(Haber & Haber, 2013; Mnookin, Cole, Dror, Fisher, Houck, Inman et al., 2011; Thompson, 
2010). 
 The SAW-IT is a derivative of the highly effective Self-Administered Interview used 
in policing (SAI©, Gabbert, Hope & Fisher, 2009). The Self-Administered Interview (SAI©) 
is a powerful evidence-based investigative tool designed to elicit comprehensive initial 
statements from witnesses and victims (Gabbert et al., 2009). The form is a standardised 
protocol of clear instructions and questions that enables witnesses to provide their own 
statements. The SAI© was developed to address the serious challenge faced by investigators 
when an incident occurs for which there are numerous eyewitnesses (e.g. a terrorist attack, a 
large-scale major incident or accident, serious assault on a train). Any of these witnesses may 
hold potentially vital information about the incident, i.e., information that will provide both 
critical leads for the investigation or compelling evidence in a trial. However, investigators 
may not have the resources in terms of time, expertise, or personnel to conduct interviews 
with many witnesses shortly after an incident. Early stage development and testing of the 
SAI© revealed that the recall tool elicited significantly more information from witnesses, 
across multiple content categories (i.e., people, actions, objects, and settings), with high 
accuracy rates (Gabbert et al., 2009). Furthermore, the initial completion of a SAI© increased 
the amount of information provided by witnesses in a delayed interview, as well as, supported 
them in being more resistant to misleading information encountered after an incident 
(Gabbert, Hope, Fisher & Jamieson, 2012; Hope, Gabbert, Fisher & Jamieson, 2014; Gittins, 
Paterson, & Sharpe, 2015). A recent meta-analysis (Pfeil, 2017) reporting the results of 15 
empirical studies observed a substantial increase in the reporting of correct details for the 
SAI© with a large summary effect size of d = 1.20, comparable to the benefit found for the CI 
(see Memon, Meissner, & Fraser, 2010). Analyses also suggested that this increase in 
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reporting of correct details also transfers to a later witness interview (d = .92). Despite being 
a relatively new investigative tool for officers tasked with eliciting initial witness accounts, 
the SAI© has been implemented effectively in a number of incidents involving multiple 
witnesses including murders, shootings, assaults, and other major crime incidents (see Hope, 
Gabbert & Fisher, 2011). 
The SAW-IT retains the information enhancing features of the SAI© but has been 
modified in content and structure in accordance with the occupational health and safety 
(OHS) literature. The modifications have been designed to support witnesses with their recall 
of information specifically relevant to industrial incident investigation (e.g. risk factors, 
workplace conditions; see Method). In accordance with the SAI©, the SAW-IT is an incident 
report form developed in line with current theoretical predictions concerning how 
information is accessed in memory. However, it differs from the SAI© in that it queries OHS 
relevant content, as well as employing cognitive probes developed using the human factors 
model SHELL (Liveware, Software, Hardware, Environment; Edwards, 1972; Hawkins, 
1993). The SHELL model targets information about such factors as the people involved 
(Liveware), procedures and resources (Software), physical environment and workplace 
operations (Environment), as well as, physical structures and equipment (Hardware). Initially 
developed for aviation, SHELL has been proven useful in a host of other industrial 
environments where adverse events may occur. The main objective of the current study was 
to assess the efficacy of these modifications to the original SAI© and evaluate the SAW-IT 
for the reporting of adverse industrial events. 
A secondary pursuit of the present research was to test the SAW-IT’s potential to 
offset the effect of bias in witnesses’ reports. Broadly, once our perceptions and judgements 
are biased it is exceedingly difficult to undo the mental modifications that have produced 
the bias (MacLean & Dror, 2016). In an attempt to de-bias people who have been exposed 
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to contaminating information, researchers have explored the benefits of encouraging people 
to invest resources in the processing of the information at a deeper level (Gervais & 
Norenzayan, 2012; Rassin, 2016). This cognitive investment discourages the ‘fast and 
frugal’ cognitive strategies (e.g., Gigerenzer & Goldstein, 1996; Gigerenzer & Selten, 2001; 
Gigerenzer, Todd, & the ABC Research Group, 1999) that can bias intuitive judgement and 
undermine accurate recall. As the SAW-IT promotes a deeper and more effortful processing 
of the experienced event than a free recall form it may, therefore, work to mitigate the 
biasing effect of contextual information on witnesses’ reporting.  
The Current Research 
 Using witnesses to a mock industrial incident we addressed the following research 
questions: First, does the SAW-IT add measurable value to the collecting of eyewitness 
memory post-event compared to a traditional incident report form (which typically takes a 
free recall format)? Second, how does knowledge regarding the safety history of a worker 
influence witnesses’ reporting of an incident, including the content of opinions and 
confabulations, and perception of causality? Third, can the SAW-IT mitigate the effect of 
contextual knowledge on witness reporting compared to a traditional free-recall incident 
report form? This research also collected users’ experiences of the SAW-IT and compared 
them to those who used a traditional free recall incident report form. The current research 
asked participants to provide a statement about an adverse workplace event that they 
witnessed using either the traditional free-recall incident report form or the SAW-IT. Half of 
the participants were informed that the driver had an unsafe work history.  
Hypotheses  
First, we predicted that the SAW-IT would facilitate the reporting of detailed 
eyewitness accounts in industrial investigation compared to a traditional incident report form. 
Specifically, we predicted that the retrieval support provided by the SAW-IT would elicit 
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more (i) correct details about the event, than the traditional measure, without compromising 
the accuracy rate (i.e., overall percentage of correct to incorrect information) and (ii) fine-
grained information compared to witnesses completing a free-recall form.  
Second, we predicted that providing participants with contextual knowledge about the 
poor safety history of the forklift driver involved in the event, shared after the witness viewed 
the event, would result in biased witness reporting (see Davis & Loftus, 2007; Frenda et al., 
2011). Specifically, we predicted that witnesses in receipt of negative contextual knowledge 
would (i) allocate a greater percentage of cause for the event to the forklift driver, as well as, 
(ii) generate a greater number of opinions and confabulations characterising the forklift driver 
as unsafe.  
Third, deep processing of information can, at times, mitigate the effect expectation 
has on judgments (e.g., Gervais & Norenzayan, 2012). Our next prediction was that the more 
involved memory retrieval activities required by the SAW-IT would reduce the amount of 
bias evident in witnesses’ cause allocations, opinions and confabulations.  
Because people have a latent bias to draw worker-focused conclusions post-event 
(e.g., DeJoy, 1987, 1994; MacLean, et al., 2013) bias was not operationalized as a departure 
from what an objective, evidenced-based, appraisal of the event would have been. Rather our 
criteria for witness bias was evidence of more unsafe forklift driver attributions by 
participants who received the unsafe worker file post-event compared to those who received 
safe worker information. Last, in order to assess the usability of the SAW-IT for reporting of 
incidents of this nature, we asked witnesses in the SAW-IT and traditional incident report 
form conditions to provide us with feedback about their respective forms. 
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Method 
Participants and Design 
The current study used a 2 (background information about the forklift driver: safe or 
unsafe) x 2 (incident report form: SAW-IT or traditional form) between-subjects design. 
Participants were randomly assigned to one of four experimental conditions, i.e., 
unsafe/SAW-IT (n = 29), unsafe/traditional form (n = 33), safe/SAW-IT (n = 17) or 
safe/traditional form (n = 25). Data from 104 undergraduate students (20 men and 84 women) 
ranging in age from 17 to 52 years (M = 21.73, SD = 4.68) was used in our analyses. Students 
participated in exchange for bonus credit in their courses. All participants were fluent in 
English; of the 30 participants who reported that English was not their first language, they 
had been speaking it an average of 14 years (SD = 5.26; range from 3 years to 23 years).  
Our a priori power analysis showed that a minimum N = 128 was required to reach 
statistical significance for a medium-sized effect with power (1 - β) set at 0.80 and α = 0.05. 
All data were collected before coding and analyses took place. We used this workflow to 
ensure that the integrity of the data collection could not be tainted by knowledge acquired in 
the course of coding. Although our initial sample was 153 participants, our final sample size 
was 104 participants after participants were screened on a manipulation check item. The 
manipulation check item asked participants to rate the driver’s safety history (1 = extremely 
unsafe; 3 = unsafe; 5 = average safety; 7 = safe; 9 = extremely safe). Participants given an 
unsafe history who selected Likert options 1 – 4 were retained for analysis as were 
participants who received safe contextual information and selected Likert options 5-9. Forty-
nine participants categorized the driver’s safety level inaccurately and were eliminated from 
analyses (32% of our initial sample). Participants who were removed from our analyses were 
similar to those retained, i.e., age (M = 21.71, SD = 4.06) and gender (10 men and 39 
women). However, a sizeable (and larger) percentage of the participants removed reported 
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that English was not their first language (43%; 21/49) although the average number of years 
they had been speaking English was consistent with those retained in our analyses (M = 
12.55, SD = 7.46; range from 2 years to 27 years). In order to make meaningful deductions 
about the effect of safety history information on witness reporting, participants who rated the 
unsafe safety information as “safe” and the safe information as “unsafe” needed to be 
eliminated from our analyses as their ratings suggest that they did not fully attend to the 
safety history information provided2. Eliminating these participants resulted in us abstaining 
from all analysis of the Report form x Context interaction because of low power (see cell 
sizes presented above).  
Materials  
Industrial event video  
The stimulus industrial event was a 1:18 minute video of a staged event in which a 
forklift truck driver navigated a lumber yard in a forklift. At a point near the end of the video 
two pedestrians approached the lane where the forklift was advancing. Neither the driver nor 
the pedestrians could see the other party approaching because of stacks of lumber at the 
intersection. Both the forklift and the pedestrians entered the intersection at the same moment 
and the video then showed a bloodied helmet on the ground indicating that the pedestrian(s) 
had been hit. It is unclear if only one or both pedestrians were injured. Pilot testing of the 
video (N = 20) revealed that the majority of participants (80%) believed that the driver was at 
                                                          
2 A criterion for making causal statements about the effect of contextual information on witness reporting was 
that participants needed to interpret our context manipulation accurately (i.e., unsafe information was interpreted 
as “unsafe” rather than “safe”, and vice versa). We thus verified that participants interpreted our information 
accurately via the manipulation check item and removed from analyses participants who did not interpret the 
manipulation as  intended. Alternatively, we could have disregarded the safety condition that participants were 
randomly assigned to and instead compared those participants who rated the background information as “safe” 
to those who rated it as “unsafe” thereby maintaining our entire sample but casting aside our manipulation. As a 
check of our results we did analyse the data using this alternative method (i.e., we separated participants based 
on how they rated the background information); here we found that all of the significant effects reported in our 
manuscript replicated.  
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least partly responsible for causing the incident (20% did not indicate the driver as causal). 
Participants who indicated the driver was causal allocated approximately half of the incident 
cause to the driver (M = 47.25%; SD = 35.37).   
Contextual information about the forklift driver  
Participants were randomly allocated one of two files about the lift driver’s safety 
history (control or unsafe). The ‘control’ file indicated that the driver had: (i) no documented 
incidents of unsafe behaviour and (ii) had consistently demonstrated safe behaviour on the 
worksite. The ‘unsafe’ (biasing) file indicated that the driver had a poor safety history. 
Specifically, that (i) although unverified, this driver is suspected of causing two near misses 
(unplanned event that does not cause injury, damage or ill health but could do so) on the 
worksite in the last year, (ii) he had been found responsible for two incidents and one near 
miss in the last three years, and (iii) the two incidents discussed above resulted in injury to 
three employees and cost the organization $20,000 in damages.  
 Incident report form  
Participants reported their account of the witnessed event on either a traditional 
incident report form or the SAW-IT. The one-page, traditional report form was modeled after 
an incident report form that is currently used by an international company in the high-risk 
sector of construction. The traditional form asks the witness, in an open-ended format, to 
report the: (i) date and time of the event, (iii) who and what the statement was regarding, and 
(ii) the “specific” and “descriptive” details of the incident. The traditional report form 
instructs witnesses that when providing information, they should consider the sequence of 
events, in chronological order and to include “very specific and descriptive detail including: 
times, names and titles of people, specifics of what was said rather than general comments, 
and a sequence of events that is accurate and includes all information. The more descriptive a 
statement the better” 
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The SAW-IT report form uses cognitively-based retrieval strategies to support 
witnesses in recalling details about the event. The SAW-IT begins with a mental 
reinstatement of context instruction that requires participants to think about what they were 
sensing and generally experiencing at the time of the incident. Next, the form asks witnesses 
to freely recall as much information about the incident as possible. The instructions just prior 
to this free recall segment ask witnesses to try to recall what happened before, during and 
after the incident; strive for completeness and accuracy; and not guess about the incident’s 
details.  
The SAW-IT then encourages witnesses to sketch the scene and to include such 
details as the location and position of equipment and people. Next on the form is a checklist 
of OHS relevant topics (SHELL, Edwards, 1972; Hawkins, 1993; Canadian Centre for 
Occupational Health and Safety [CCOHS], 2016), from which witnesses were asked to select 
the topics that that they felt were relevant to the incident that they had witnessed. Items in the 
checklist are categorized as either “information and documentation”, “equipment and 
physical needs”, “general working and environmental conditions”, and “people.” Following 
the checklist, the SAW-IT provides space for witnesses to elaborate on any information, that 
pertained to their checklist selections, that they did not share earlier in the form. The final 
page of the SAW-IT encourages participants to share information that they felt was relevant 
but had not been asked about. Periodically, throughout the form, witnesses are reminded not 
to guess. 
Procedure 
After giving informed consent, participants watched a video of an industrial incident 
in which a forklift struck a pedestrian causing the pedestrian serious injuries. Depending on 
experimental condition, some participants received a file with information that the forklift 
driver had an unsafe history while the others received a file that the forklift driver had no 
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history of unsafe behaviour (control). Participants then rated the level of safety of the driver. 
Participants then reported their age, sex and proficiency at English (i.e., if English was their 
first language and if not what other language do they speak and how long have they spoken 
English). Participants also engaged in solving word puzzles and a word search for five-
minutes. Next, participants answered “yes” or “no” to a question asking if they had received 
safety information about the forklift driver.  
Participants then reported what occurred in the incident using either the SAW-IT or a 
traditional incident report form. Participants were unaware of a 30-minute time limit they had 
to complete their report and no participants exceeded the time limit afforded for reporting. 
Following completion of the incident report form and after a brief instruction demonstrating 
how to allocate 100% of the cause for the event, each witness allocated cause for the incident. 
Participants used an open-ended format in which they listed the factor(s) that they viewed as 
causal, such as a worker’s action, the failure of a piece of equipment, and/or an 
environmental condition, and allocated a corresponding percentage of cause for each.3 
Participants then rated the usability of the forms, reporting on how understandable the 
form was, the reading level required by the form, if the content of the form was confusing, 
and if they were ever unsure of how to use the form.   
Recall Coding 
Information on the SAW-IT and traditional report form was coded by two raters as 
either correct (correct items in the narrative); incorrect (items that were present in the video 
but reported incorrectly e.g., an action is performed but the wrong person is credited for it); 
                                                          
3 In an exploratory task not related to the current hypotheses, witnesses completed eight final questions which 
queried aspects relevant for OHS investigation recommended by the CCOHS (2016; materials, environment, 
tasks, management, and personnel). Three questions explored the actions of the driver (i.e., speed, amount of 
attention, and the amount of notification given to others on the worksite of his presence), one question about the 
amount of attention paid by the pedestrians, two questions about the equipment (i.e., condition of the truck and 
driver’s visibility) and two questions about the environment (i.e., lighting and road conditions). These questions 
were exploratory and as they do not relate to the current hypotheses, results are not reported in the current 
manuscript. 
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confabulations (items reported that were not present in the video) or opinions (a subjective 
assertion about some aspect of the video, e.g., “[The driver] was driving too fast”). Within 
each of these four categories the items were also subcategorized according to the SHELL 
information categories of driver, pedestrian, hardware, software, or environment. In addition, 
opinions and confabulations were also coded as either safe, unsafe, or neutral safety.  
The two coders followed a detailed set of definitions and rules developed from the 
participants’ responses on the report forms to code the forms. Twenty-one of the traditional 
forms and thirteen of the SAW-IT incident report forms (22% of the original 153 
participants’ forms) were independently rated by each rater and this generated an inter-rater 
agreement rate (number of statements agreed upon by both raters divided by the total number 
of statements [number agreed + number disagreed]). Coders independently coded the witness 
statements for correctness (correct, incorrect, confabulations) and opinions. Mean inter-rater 
agreements for these categories were acceptable, ranging from .70 - .83. Inconsistencies were 
resolved via discussion using a common understanding of the coding rules. 
The information on the witnesses’ report forms was also coded for grain-size. Coarse 
grain reporting is characterized as general whereas fine grain is more precise (see Weber & 
Brewer, 2008). For instance, a coarse grain response would be reporting that the worker wore 
a “hat” whereas a fine grain response of this same content would be the report that the worker 
wore a “white hard hat.” Nineteen content areas were assessed on their level of information 
specificity (See Table 2 for content categories and examples of fine and coarse grain content 
in each category). Twenty-eight percent of the initial 153 forms (n = 20 traditional forms and 
n = 23 SAW-IT forms) were coded by two coders for grain size. If a content item was present 
in the narrative, each coder independently coded it as coarse grain or fine grain. For each 
grain size category, the number of items agreed on was divided by the total number of items 
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(number agree + number disagreed). Inter-rater agreement was .91 for coarse grain details 
and .97 for fine grain details.  
The sketch instruction and the checklist are important aspects of the SAW-IT because 
of the value that they add in a real-world industrial incident investigation, as well as, the 
cognitive support they provide for witness recall. In the current study, however, these features 
of the SAW-IT were not coded as we focused on written output only which enabled us to 
compare between conditions. Importantly, all participants in the SAW-IT form condition 
sketched the scene and selected items from the OHS checklist. On average, participants 
selected 16 items on the checklist (M = 15.89, SD = 5.88; range 5 to 29).  
Results 
Comparing performance of the SAW-IT with the traditional report form 
Correct details, incorrect details, confabulations, and opinions  
Univariate ANOVAs were used to test the between-subjects variables of context 
(control safe or unsafe) and incident report form (traditional form or SAW-IT) on the main 
dependent variables: the number of correct details, incorrect details, confabulated details and 
opinions reported. To adjust for multiple comparisons, the effects of the ANOVAs were 
evaluated at the α = .01 level of significance. Participants in the SAW-IT condition reported 
significantly more correct details than those in the traditional statement form condition, F (1, 
100) = 18.79, p < .001, ɳ2p = .16, 95% CI [.05, .28]. However, the main effect of context was 
not significant, F (1, 100) = 2.64, p = .11, ɳ2p = .03, 95% CI [0, .11].  
Participants in the SAW-IT condition reported significantly more opinions than those 
in the traditional statement form condition, F (1, 100) = 60.11, p < .001, ɳ2p = .38, 95% CI 
[.23, .49]. Again, the main effect of context was not significant, F (1, 100) = 4.09, p = .05, ɳ2p 
= .04, 95% CI [0, .14].  
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Witness reporting form had no effect on the number of incorrect details reported, F (1, 
100) = 2.01, p = .16, ɳ2p = .02, 95% CI [0, .10], or confabulations, F (1, 100) = 0.25, p = .61, 
ɳ2p = .003, 95% CI [0, .05]. Likewise, context did not affect the number of incorrect details 
reported, F (1, 100) = 0.04, p = .85, ɳ2p < .001, 95% CI [0, .02], or confabulations, F (1, 100) 
= 0.13, p = .72, ɳ2p = .001, 95% CI [0, .05].  
 Accuracy rates were computed by dividing the number of correct details by the sum 
of the total correct details, incorrect details and confabulations. Opinions were not included in 
the accuracy rate calculation as opinions are not factual details about what occurred, rather 
they are people’s impression of what happened. Participants in the current research were, on 
average, quite accurate (M = .86, SD = .09). There was no significant difference between 
participants in the report form conditions, F (1, 100) = 0.21, p = .65, ɳ2p = .002, 95% CI [0, 
.05] or the context conditions, F (1, 100) = 0.19, p = .66, ɳ2p = .002, 95% CI [0, .05]. See 
Table 1 for means and standard deviations relating to report form.  
Recall of OHS category details 
Narratives were coded according to the OHS relevant topic categories of driver, 
pedestrian, hardware, software and environment. Again, we adjusted for multiple 
comparisons by setting an α = .01 level of significance. Although the accuracy rate in the two 
forms was comparable, for nearly all of the coding categories that we analysed, the number of 
correct details reported was significantly higher in the SAW-IT condition than in the 
traditional statement form condition (driver: F [1, 100] = 7.14, p = .01, ɳ2p = .07, 95% CI [0, 
.18]; pedestrians: F [1, 100] = 4.49, p = .04, ɳ2p = .04, 95% CI [0, .14]; hardware: F [1, 100] 
= 18.96, p < .001, ɳ2p = .16, 95% CI [.05, .29]; environment: F [1, 100] = 14.28, p < .001, ɳ2p 
= .13, 95% CI [.03, .25]). See Table 1 for means and standard deviations. 
In relation to our manipulation of context, there were no significant effects on number 
of correct details (driver: F [1, 100] = .30, p = .58, ɳ2p = .003, 95% CI [0, .06]; pedestrians: F 
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[1, 100] = .15, p = .70,  ɳ2p = .001, 95% CI [0, .05]; environment: F [1, 100] = 2.14, p = .15, 
ɳ2p = .02, 95% CI [0, .10]; and hardware: F (1, 100) = 5.52, p = .02, partial η2 = .05, 95% CI 
[0, .16]). The software category was not analyzable due the very low number of details 
categorized as such in both reporting conditions.  
Grain size  
Two univariate ANOVAs were used to test the effects of context and incident report 
form on the number of (i) total fine-grain details and then (ii) total coarse-grain details 
provided by witnesses in their narratives regarding nineteen event-relevant details. Details 
analysed were descriptions of the equipment, environment and people, as well as, information 
about what happened immediately before, during, and after the contact event between the 
driver and pedestrian(s) (See Table 2). To adjust for multiple comparisons, the effects of the 
ANOVAs were evaluated at the α = .01 level of significance.  
Participants in the SAW-IT condition reported significantly more fine-grained details 
(M = 4.93, SD = 2.25) than participants in the traditional form condition (M = 3.67, SD = 
2.19), F (1, 100) = 9.32, p = .003, ɳ2p = .09, 95% CI [.01, .20]. There was no main effect of 
context, F (1, 100) = 2.53, p = .12, ɳ2p = .03, 95% CI [0, .11]. Regarding coarse-grain details, 
no significant effects were found for context, F (1, 100) = .02, p = .88, ɳ2p < .001, 95% CI 
[.00, .01], or report form, F (1, 100) = 1.87, p = .17, ɳ2p = .02, 95% CI [.00, .10].  
Context Effects  
Effect of context on perception of cause  
A mixed-factorial ANOVA was used to test the between-subjects variables of context 
(control safe or unsafe) and incident report form (traditional form or SAW-IT) and the 
within-subjects dependent variable of cause (percentage of cause to the driver and percentage 
of cause to the pedestrian(s)). Note that the driver and pedestrian(s) were two factors, out of a 
number of factors (e.g., environment, forklift), to which participants allocated a percentage of 
cause for the incident. Findings demonstrated a significant difference between the proportions 
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of causality attributed to the driver and the pedestrians, respectively, F (1, 100) = 7.89, p < 
.01, ɳ2p = .07, 95% CI [.01, .18] and a significant interaction between context and the 
proportion of cause, F (1, 100) = 18.88, p < .001, ɳ2p = .16, 95% CI [.05, .29]. Participants in 
the control bias condition did not significantly differ in the amount of cause that they 
allocated to the forklift driver (M = 27.42, SD = 28.92) and the pedestrians (M = 32.73, SD = 
30.75), F (1, 40) = .70, ɳ2p = .02, 95% CI [.01, .16]. However, participants who received 
biasing contextual information about the safety of the forklift driver allocated significantly 
more cause to the driver (M = 46.81, SD = 27.21) than the pedestrians (M = 18.26, SD = 
18.74), F (1, 60) = 43.97, p < .001, ɳ2p = .42, 95% CI [.23, .56].  
The effect of report form was significant, F (1, 100) = 3.96, p = .05, ɳ2p = .04, 95% CI 
[0, .13], and demonstrated that those in the traditional form condition averaged more cause to 
the worker and pedestrian (M = 34.29, SD = 26.32) than those in the SAW-IT condition (M = 
27.39, SD = 28.28). Hence, those in the SAW-IT allocated more cause to other factors on the 
worksite. There was no significant effect of context, F (1, 100) = .96, p = .33, ɳ2p = .01, 95% 
CI [0, .08], nor a Report form x Cause interaction, F (1, 100) = .05, p = .83, ɳ2p < .001, 95% 
CI [0, .02]. Because of low power for the interaction, we were unable to test the Report form 
x Context x Cause interaction to determine if the SAW-IT mitigated the effect of context on 
participants’ cause allocations.  
Effect of context on narrative content  
Participants’ confabulations and opinions were coded for how safely they 
characterized the truck driver’s behaviour, i.e., either safe, unsafe, and no valence. To explore 
the effect of context on confabulations and opinions about the driver we computed two 
variables, one that summed confabulations and opinions that suggested unsafe driver 
behaviour and one that summed confabulations and opinions that suggested safe driver 
behaviour. These two new variables were then used in a mixed factorial ANOVA that tested 
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the between-subjects variables of context (control safe or unsafe), incident report form 
(traditional or SAW-IT) and the within-subjects variable of safety content (sum of 
confabulations and opinions indicating unsafe driver behaviour and sum of confabulations 
and opinions indicating safe driver behaviour).  
Participants tended to make confabulations and deliver opinions that characterized the 
driver as unsafe (M = 5.08, SD = 4.02) rather than safe (M = 1.39, SD = 2.72), F (1, 100) = 
54.08, p < .001, ɳ2p = .35, 95% CI [.21, .47]. The Context x Safety content interaction was 
significant, F (1, 100) = 5.13, p = .03, ɳ2p = .05, 95% CI [0, .15]. Figure 1 illustrates that 
participants in both the control contextual information condition, F (1, 40) = 13.66, p < .01, 
ɳ2p = .26, 95% CI [.05, .44], and unsafe context condition, F (1, 60) = 51.08, p < .001, ɳ2p = 
.46, 95% CI [.27, .59], generated a greater number of statements that characterized the driver 
as unsafe rather than safe but the magnitude of this difference was greater for those who 
received unsafe background information.  
A significant main effect of report form revealed that those in the SAW-IT condition 
(M = 4.75, SD = 4.27) reported significantly more opinions and confabulations about safety 
compared to those in the traditional statement form condition (M = 2.04, SD = 1.57), F (1, 
100) = 41.61, p < .001, ɳ2p = .29, 95% CI [.15, .42]. There was no significant Report form x 
Safety content interaction, F (1, 100) = .26, p = .61, ɳ2p = .003, 95% CI [0, .06].    
Usability Questionnaire 
 Participants in the both the SAW-IT and traditional form conditions reported that the 
form was understandable (SAW-IT, M = 6.67, SD = 1.31; traditional form condition, M = 
7.09, SD = 1.67; 1 = very hard to understand to 9= very easy to understand). On a scale that 
asked about participants comfort with English (1 = very uncomfortable to 9 = very 
comfortable), participants in both form conditions rated that they were comfortable with the 
reading level required by the forms (SAW-IT, M = 8.51, SD = 1.31; traditional form 
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condition, M = 8.19, SD =1.78) and with writing their report in English (SAW-IT, M = 7.98, 
SD = 1.47; traditional form condition, M = 7.55, SD = 1.62).   
A small number of participants indicated that they were confused by words or phrases 
on the forms (traditional form, 3/58; SAW-IT, 4/46), but no form was found to be more 
confusing than the other, X2 (1, N = 103) = .55, p = .46, Ф = -.07. The words or phrases listed 
as confusing were: “substandard”, “safety culture” or, more generally, “terms in the 
checklist.” These terms may have been confusing to participants because they were not an 
industry-based sample. Further analysis of the usability of the forms found that some 
participants reported that they were unsure of what they were supposed to do on the form 
(traditional form, 9/58; SAW-IT, 18/45); here a significant difference was found between 
conditions, with a greater number of participants using the SAW-IT form expressing 
uncertainty, X2 (1, N = 103) = 7.85, p = .01, Ф = -.28. Responding participants in the SAW-IT 
condition cited that the checklist was unclear (n = 9) and that some instructions did not fit 
with their experience given that they were not physically present for the incident (e.g., 
context reinstatement or where to situate themselves when drawing; n = 8). One participant 
completing the traditional form reported that (s)he would have preferred instructions on the 
bottom of the form be located at the top. The remaining participants in both conditions made 
the error of using the opportunity to report that the filler activities or other aspects of the 
testing were unclear to them (traditional form, n = 7; SAW-IT, n = 1).    
Discussion 
The SAW-IT elicited significantly more correct details, and more precise information, 
about the witnessed incident than the traditional incident report form often used in industry. 
This increase in the number of correct details reported occurred across all relevant OHS 
categories (e.g., equipment, environment, worksite employees; CCOHS, 2016; Edwards, 
1972; Hawkins, 1993). Importantly, the enhanced reporting performance observed in the 
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SAW-IT condition was not achieved at a cost to the accuracy rate (percentage of accurate 
information). Accuracy rates in the SAW-IT condition were as robust as those observed for 
the traditional incident report form. We found that witnesses who completed the SAW-IT 
tended to share more opinions than those who completed the traditional report form which 
may be a by-product of a format that cognitively engaged the witness and facilitated 
communication. Our participants also reported that the SAW-IT was easy to understand, that 
it was not confusing, and that the required reading level was comfortable. Hence, the finding 
that the SAW-IT elicits a large amount of correct information is promising and suggests that 
it may be a valuable investigative tool for those OHS professionals charged with 
investigating industrial events.   
A novel contribution of the current research was the exploration of the effect of 
contextual information on witnesses’ perceptions of cause and reporting of information. Due 
to low power however, we did not test whether an innovative reporting format would mitigate 
those effects. We found that context had significant effects on participants’ reports. 
Specifically, participants who received the unsafe forklift driver history reported that he was 
more causal for the incident and they generated more unsafe confabulations and opinions in 
their narratives about the driver’s behaviour than those who received safe background 
information. The effect of the biasing information shared post-event is not entirely surprising 
as research has consistently shown that information encountered post-incident can be both 
influential and resistant to correction (Davis & Loftus, 2007).  
Our findings that exposure to information about a driver’s unsafe work history biased 
witnesses reporting is relevant to OHS investigations. Witnesses who had received unsafe 
history information reported that the driver was more causal in the incident and generated 
more opinions and confabulations that characterized the driver as unsafe in the incident 
compared to those who received neutral/safe background information. Interestingly, we found 
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that those in the safe condition generated a greater number of opinions than those in the 
unsafe condition. We speculate that this increase could be a product of the fundamental 
attribution error, which likely encouraged the opinions of all participants to intimate unsafe 
worker behaviour, and the safe history information. The history information may have 
encouraged participants to also generate opinions characterising the worker as safe increasing 
the total number of opinions.  
Recall that initial opinions, exaggerations, and confabulations shared by a person can 
affect other people’s judgements in investigative environments (i.e., bias snowball effect, 
Dror, 2012). Opinions shared by a witness with an investigator may not only influence the 
fact-finder to seek and interpret information in a biased fashion (for reviews on confirmation 
bias; Kassin, Dror, & Kukucka, 2013; Nickerson, 1998) but also affect the perceptions, 
judgments and testimony of other people related to the investigation. OHS investigators’ 
conclusions are used to develop safety protocols post-event so that similar events do not 
happen in the future. Biased judgements can, therefore, have a legacy in that factors that 
should have received more investigative attention go unanalysed in favour of other leading or 
‘preferred’ hypotheses. Although future research on the SAW-IT should be executed in a 
more ecologically valid environments, we believe that our findings reinforce the importance 
of blinding (Robertson & Kesselheim, 2016) not only investigators to unnecessary 
information that may be biasing, but also other individuals providing information in the 
investigation.  
In workplace scenarios where witnesses are at risk of experiencing biasing 
information post-event, an easy and effective method of protecting people’s recollections is 
to administer the SAW-IT as soon as possible post-incident. This strategy should not only 
support the capture of a high-quality witness statement but may also protect against 
misinformation encountered post-questioning (see Gabbert, Hope, Fisher & Jamieson, 2012; 
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Gittins, Paterson, & Sharpe, 2015). However, in industrial investigation, the remedy for 
mitigating the effect of biasing expectations generated via context may be more complex than 
immediate questioning. Unlike many criminal incident scenarios, workers may have 
entrenched expectations of the factors involved in the event, e.g., coworkers, machinery, 
developed via years of experience. This information is a priori knowledge that can taint 
testimony at both the level of encoding and recollection and is difficult to manage with 
practical bias reducing strategies such as Linear Sequential Unmasking (LSU; a protocol in 
which potentially biasing information is masked and then revealed as needed, Dror et al. 
2015; also see Dror, 2013 for practical strategies). Hence, future research should pursue 
strategies designed to minimize the effect of biasing expectations in the industrial 
investigation.   
The limitations and benefits of the SAW-IT are similar to those outlined for the SAI© 
(Gabbert et al., 2009) and consistent with those faced by incident report forms currently used 
by industry. The SAW-IT is a written reporting format which may pose a barrier for people 
with language and writing difficulties. Developments are underway to support responding in 
alternative formats to navigate communication difficulties. In addition, witness motivation to 
complete the form may be a limiting factor in industrial incident investigation. Workers may 
be uncomfortable providing a detailed account of an event if it negatively affects their 
employment (e.g., regulatory body suspends work to resolve the worksite issues) or in which 
they, or a close colleague, are partially responsible. This resistance should be partially 
mitigated by the instructions on the SAW-IT that the shared information will be used to 
enhance safety; however, OHS investigators could further motivate witnesses to share 
information by communicating, when possible, that the information will not be used to 
generate penalties. Furthermore, the ecological validity of the current study was limited by 
our use of students who have minimal knowledge of the workplace involved in the incident 
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and a video rather than a staged event. It is reasonable to assume that the effect of biasing 
contextual information will differ in magnitude when paired with familiar versus unfamiliar 
workplace environments. Future development of the tool should examine its performance 
with a sample of individuals knowledgeable about specific work contexts.  
Reviews of the usability of the form were broadly positive. A small number of 
participants who completed the SAW-IT noted that the checklist portion of the form could 
have been presented more clearly. Some confusion regarding terms on the checklist may have 
occurred because our sample comprised of university students who were unfamiliar with 
common industrial terminology. Instructions of how to use the checklist could also be 
clarified for participants to better support their use of it. Finally some participants expressed 
confusion because some aspects of instructions were likely more relevant for people who had 
experienced an event rather than viewed it on a video screen; this is unlikely to be an issue 
for witnesses to real workplace events. Taken together, this feedback is useful and will assist 
in the forward development of the SAW-IT. 
These limitations are relatively minimal in light of the procedural benefits for OHS 
professionals that might accrue from use of the SAW-IT. For example, the investigator does 
not need to tackle decisions about witness priority at the moment of the incident when more 
pressing aspects of the investigation may need to be managed. All witnesses can complete the 
form in a timely manner and preserve their memory regardless of their status in the 
investigation as a key or peripheral witness. Investigators are then in a position to prioritise 
any follow-up interviews on the basis of the most meaningful initial accounts. In addition, 
generating a thorough account of the event immediately post-incident has been shown to 
preserve memory for more comprehensive recall at a later date (Hope et al., 2014). The 
SAW-IT is an incident report form that provides a standardized questioning format, based on 
psychological theory and existing guidelines for best practice investigative interviewing. 
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Multiple witnesses can individually complete the SAW-IT simultaneously, without being 
monitored by the investigator. This concurrent information collection releases valuable 
resources during incident investigation, such as enabling investigators to pursue other tasks 
including managing the scene and securing physical evidence.  
Conclusion and Practical Application 
Our results demonstrate that the SAW-IT TM offers a novel and effective strategy for 
collecting witness information post-incident. This reporting format is easy for investigators to 
administer and for witnesses to use. The results of the current study are promising and 
suggest that the SAW-IT can provide a useful approach to information gathering, informed 
by psychological science, in the industrial incident investigation context. We encourage 
others to build on our initial findings in applied contexts.  
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Table 1. Mean correct details, incorrect details and confabulations, and accuracy rates 
reported in each report form condition, standard deviations in parentheses.  
Details       SAW-IT      Traditional   
  M (SD) M (SD) F p 
Driver Correct details 6.80 (2.47) 5.48 (2.37) 7.14 .01 
 Incorrect details & 
confabulations 
0.70 (0.99) 0.86 (1.03)   
 Opinions 3.22 (2.14) 2.41 (1.88)   
 Accuracy rate 0.92 (0.13) 0.88 (0.14)   
Pedestrians Correct details 5.28 (2.92) 4.16 (1.98) 4.49 .04 
 Incorrect details & 
Confabulations 
1.07 (0.95) 0.64 (0.67)   
 Opinions 1.13 (1.54) 0.66 (1.09)   
 Accuracy rate .83 (0.16) .86 (0.17)   
Hardware Correct details 4.09 (2.80) 2.24 (1.76) 18.96 <.001 
 Incorrect details & 
Confabulations 
1.09 (1.22) .79 (0.95)   
 Opinions 1.48 (1.98) 0.16 (0.45)   
 Accuracy rate 0.78 (0.26) 0.71 (0.35)   
Environment Correct details 3.57 (2.01) 2.21 (1.74) 14.28 <.001 
 Incorrect details & 
Confabulations 
0.46 (0.72) 0.26 (0.55)   
 Opinions 2.76 (2.64) 0.57 (0.82)   
 Accuracy rate 0.88 (0.18) 0.92 (0.16)   
Software Correct details 0.04 (0.21) 0 (0)   
 Incorrect details & 
Confabulations 
0 (0) 0 (0)   
 Opinions 2.54 (3.76) 0.12 (0.68)   
 Accuracy rate       
Total Correct details 19.99 (7.57) 14.30 (5.54) 18.79  <.001 
 Incorrect details  2.04 (1.52) 1.53 (1.49) 2.01 = 0.16 
 Confabulations 1.20 (1.00) 1.02 (1.11)               0.25 = 0.62 
 Opinions 10.85 (6.47) 3.95 (2.74) 60.11 <.001 
 Accuracy rate 0.85  (0.09) 0.85 (0.09)                     0.21 = 0.65 
* The “Correct details,” “Incorrect details,” and “Confabulations” categories demonstrate the mean number of 
statements made by participants. “Accuracy rate” is a calculation in which the number of correct details is 
divided by the sum of the number of correct details, incorrect details and confabulations. Note that the 
“software” category is not included in the present table due to extremely low numbers.  
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Table 2. Grain Size of Report Form Content 
 
Description of the Critical Items in the Event Video                              Example         Frequency 
 
                 Course Grain (CG)         Fine Grain (FG)     No Mention    CG         FG 
 
1. Equipment: Type of Vehicle      work vehicle  forklift    9 21 74 
 
2. Equipment: Colour of Vehicle     coloured  red and white   102 0 2 
 
3. Environment: Description of Road     road    wet road   79 15 10 
 
4. People Description: Colour of Driver’s Clothes   dark jacket  green jacket   102 1 1 
 
5. People Description: Head Protection of Driver   hat   hard hat   95 0 9 
 
6. People Description: Hearing Protection of Driver  ear protection  ear plugs   84 4 16 
 
7. People Description: Colour of Pedestrians’ Clothes   jacket   florescent jacket  92 2 10 
 
8. People Description: Head Protection of Pedestrians  hat   hard hat   84 2 18  
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Immediately Before Contact 
 
9. Environment: Viewing Obstruction between    obstacle  stacked wood   30 20 54 
the driver and pedestrians 
 
10. People Action: Pedestrians Communication Behaviour  walking   talking while walking  95 1 8 
 
11. People Action: Pedestrians Walking Direction  walking on the site coming to an intersection 14 41 49 
 
12. People Action: Pedestrians Looking Behaviour  walking   heads down   72 0 32 
 
13. People Action: Speed of Vehicle     driving the vehicle didn’t slow down  77 4 23 
 
14. People Action: Direction of Vehicle     driving through site coming to an intersection 25 39 40 
 
15. People Action: Movement to Wheel    turns wheel  turns the wheel left or right 89 10 5 
 
 
Moment of Contact 
 
16. Environment: Pedestrians’ sight    workers hit  workers didn’t see the truck  75 17 12 
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17. Environment: Driver’s sight     hit with workers didn’t see the workers  20 35 49 
 
 
Immediately After Contact 
 
18. People Description: Pedestrian Injury   workers hurt  hard hat with blood  79 9 16 
 
19. People Action: Stopping Action of the Lift Truck  forklift stops  forklift stops immediately 90 6 8 
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Figure 1. Participants’ mean number of safe and unsafe opinion and confabulation statements 
about the driver when they had received either the safe or unsafe contextual information 
about the driver. Error bars represent the 95% between-subjects confidence intervals based on 
the standard error of the mean.  
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